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Abstract:
Several authors have argued that the second-best environmental tax on a “dirty good” is less than
the marginal emission damage associated with its consumption. These studies limit their analysis
to cases in which emissions can only be reduced by a proportional reduction of the “dirty” good.
With a more general specification of technology that allows emissions to be directly as well as
indirectly taxed, we show that the direct emission tax cannot be less than its marginal emission
damage, regardless of the normalization.
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The question of the second-best environmental taxation has become important during the
past decade, especially as it relates to the moderation of global warming. The size of the
optimal environmental tax in relation to the marginal environmental damage and whether
the tax provides a “double dividend” remains controversial however.
Early contributions stressed the additional benefits (denoted as the “revenue-recycling”
effect by Parry, 1995) of using environmental tax revenue to reduce the excess burden of
pre-existing taxes [Nichols 1984, Terkla 1984, Lee and Misiolek 1986, Pearce 1991,
Repetto et. al. 1992]. Nordhaus (1993), for example, using the DICE framework,
empirically derived large carbon taxes when such revenue recycling was allowed, and
much smaller taxes when it was not allowed. These studies implicitly assumed that
environmental taxes have no excess burden as initially suggested by Tullock (1967).
In contrast, Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) showed that when other taxes are present in
the system, environmental taxes may exacerbate pre-existing distortions and that this
unfavorable “tax-interaction” effect may outweigh the favorable “revenue-recycling”
effect. They used a model involving taxation of two commodities, “clean” and “dirty”
goods, and sole input, labor. Using a similar model, but with a dirty intermediate input in
addition to a dirty good, Bovenberg and Goulder (1996) derived optimal taxes on the dirty
good (or input) as a ratio of the corresponding MED to the marginal cost of public funds
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(MCPF). Since MCPF exceeds unity in the presence of distortionary taxation, the tax on
the “dirty” good (or input) must be less that the MED.
On the other hand, Fullerton,
1 (1997) and Schöb (1997) have shown in the context of the
first model (no intermediate good) that environmental taxes can be greater or smaller than
the MED depending on whether the price/tax system is normalized to set the clean good
tax to zero or the labor tax to zero.
 2
These analyses, while useful in understanding the interactions of taxes in a general
equilibrium system, have focused on emissions that are proportional to output of one of
the commodities or inputs.  Therefore, they do not allow for separate taxation of
emissions and the final or intermediate good that causes emissions
3.  The only way to
reduce emissions is to reduce the production of the “dirty” good. However, since there are
other ways of reducing emissions, such as changing the input mix in favor of less polluting
inputs or using some of the inputs to “clean-up” emissions, it is important to examine a
second-best tax on emissions themselves that allows a more general specification of
abatement measures.
                                           
1 Fullerton also clarifies how the results of  Boveberg and de Mooij (1994) depend on the
complementarity between dirty good and labor. Fuest and Huber (1999) show that when there is
gross substitutability between the dirty good and the other tax base (labor/clean good), the
optimal tax on the dirty good always exceeds the Pigovian tax.
2 Even in this case, however, the corrective part of the dirty good tax is considered to be less
than the MED [Williams 2001].
3 Fullerton and Metcalf (2001) do consider a direct emissions tax but do not compare the tax with
the MED. They show that environmental instruments decrease welfare if they generate rents not
captured by government
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We set up  a model that allows separate taxation of goods and emissions and by treating
emissions as an “input” in production. In this model, we show that the optimal emission
tax is equal to or larger than the MED, regardless of tax normalization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The model and derivation of the central
result are provided in section 2.  Section 3 explains the effect of price/tax normalization
and shows that our result is robust under a change of normalization. Section 4 interprets
the results and section 5 concludes.
2. Comparing Emissions Tax and the Marginal Emissions Damage
In this section, we set up a simple model of an economy with two goods, one of which is a
“dirty” in the sense that its production causes emissions, while the other is a “clean” good.
While the generation of emissions in the production of the dirty good can be modeled as a
by-product, it is not uncommon in environmental tax literature to treat emissions as an
input in such cases e [e.g., Fullerton and Metcalf (2001) and Oates and Strassmann
(1984)]
4, and we follow this approach. With a government revenue constraint, we can
have a tax on each of the two goods and two inputs.
To find the optimal emissions tax, we use a two step procedure, for clarity. First, we
establish a hypothetical market for emissions that gives us an emissions price, just like the
price of labor, i.e., the payment from producers to consumers for the use of a factor of
production. The two goods and inputs are taxed on the consumer side to raise the revenue
                                           
4 This allows for flexible emissions abatement by changing the input mix. Fullerton and Metcalf
use this technology in comparing the rent-generating and rent-capturing emissions control
policies. Oates and Strassmann use it to compare the efficiency of effluent fees under different
non-competitive market structures.
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to meet the government constraint. In the second step, the emissions price is replaced by
an equal tax on producers that is transferred to the consumer (in other words, the
government takes over the function of the market, hypothetically, of course). This tax is
the equivalent of a Pigouvian tax in the second-best (similar to the Pigouvian component
of the environmental tax pointed out by Fullerton, (1997), while the consumer tax on
emissions is the Ramsey component that is used to raise revenue). We compare this
emissions price/tax with the marginal emissions damage (MED) and show that the former
can not be less than the latter.
2.1. The Model
Consider a simple economy with two private goods, c and d, whose production increases
in labor, l, and allowable emissions, so that:
( 1 ) ) , ( c c e l c c = , ) , ( d d e l d d = ,
where lc and ld are labor inputs to sector c and d respectively and ec and ed are
corresponding emissions inputs.
In order to simplify and render the derivation more transparent, we employ a two-step
procedure by first solving for the optimal emission price as if an emission market exists
and then replacing that market with an equivalent emissions tax. The consumer owns the
total endowment of pollution rights and sells part of it to the producers through an
emissions market
5 and consumes the rest, just as he/she sells part of the total labor
                                           
5 Here, the emissions amount sold is determined by supply and demand of consumer and
producers. In the usual emissions permits market with an emissions quota traded among the
emissions generators, the government acts on behalf of the consumer in issuing the permits.
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endowment and consumes the rest as leisure. Thus, lc + ld = l = (1-v) and ec + ed = e =
(1-n), where v is leisure and n is the quantity of rights reserved by the consumer (the total
endowment of labor, l + v, is normalized to unity, as is the total endowment of natural
environment, e + n).
The producers’ profit-maximizing first-order conditions (FOCs) are:
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where w is the wage rate, pe is the emissions market price, and pc and pd are the producer
prices of the good c and d respectively.
The representative consumer’s utility is u(c, d, v, n, G), where G is a government good
financed through taxes, is weakly separable in the utility function and is held constant
(following e.g., Bovenberg and de Mooij 1994).
The consumer maximizes utility subject to the budget constraint:
( 3 ) ) 1 .( . ) 1 .( ) 1 .( . ) 1 .( . d d c e e l t p d t c t p e t w l + + + = - + -
where p
d is the producer price of the good, d, and we have normalized the producer price,
p
c, of the good c, to unity. The resulting first-order conditions (FOCs) are:
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where l is the marginal utility of income. The government revenue constraint to finance G
is:
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( 5 ) G t p d t c t p e t w l d d c e e l         . . . . . . . ‡ + + +
Having set up the model, we next explain the replacement of the emissions price with an
equivalent tax on the producers of the dirty good.
2.2. Emissions Tax without Emissions Market
When an emissions market does not exist, an equivalent solution can be obtained by
replacing the emissions price, p
e, with an equal emissions tax, T
e, that is imposed by the
government
6 on the producers and paid to the consumer. Therefore, we can use the
emissions price as a proxy for this emissions tax on producers to compare it with the first-
best MED or Pigouvian tax.
Notice that this emissions tax on producers (T
e) is different from the emissions tax (t
e) on
the consumer that is used just like a labor tax to raise revenue but not to internalize the
externality. The emissions tax on producers, T
e, is primarily a mechanism to internalize the
emissions externality in the absence of a market. However, its revenue can also be used by
the government rather than returning it to the consumer, and that would be equivalent to
an additional tax on the consumers. Thus we can translate the emissions price into a
emissions tax on producers. Until the revenue requirement (G) exceeds this producer tax
revenue, we remain in the first-best world and afterwards second-best taxation is
indicated.
                                           
6 Abstracting away from the information constraints of the government.
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Next, we can compare the emissions price with the Pigouvian tax, and know, from the
above discussions, that the same comparison would apply to the emissions tax on
producers in place of the emissions price.
2.3. Comparing the Emissions Price/Tax with the Pigouvian Tax
Now we use the consumer first-order conditions to obtain an expression for the emissions
price that would allow us to compare it with the marginal emissions damage. As we have
argued in the previous section, this comparison would also apply to the emissions tax on
producers, allowing us to determine whether such emissions tax is equal to, or smaller or
larger than the MED.
The consumer FOCs in (3) above are:
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The marginal utility of income, l, can be derived from (i) as







Plugging (6) in (iv) gives:
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where tp on the R.H.S. is just the first-best marginal emissions damage (MED) or
Pigouvian Tax
7. Re-arranging (7), we get:























































( 10 ) p e t p ‡ ￿ when  ) 1 , 0 [     and     ] 1 , 0 [ ˛ ˛ e c t t
8
Thus, when either of the taxes tc or te is positive, the emissions price is larger than the
(first-best) MED or Pigouvian tax. When there are no other taxes, the two are equal and
we get the Pigouvian principle. Any positive commodity tax would reduce the producer
prices of the consumer goods and increase the relative price of emissions. This is because
a consumer commodity tax reduces the marginal utility of income [see (6) above] and
increases the resulting second-best marginal emissions damage [the R.H.S. of (8) above]
above its first-best level. If there is a consumer emissions tax, the emissions price [L.H.S.
of (9) above] is even higher than the second-best MED. Thus, the emissions price
(implemented as a emissions tax on producers) is also larger than the first-best MED.
In the next section, we examine whether there is any effect of tax normalization on this
result.
                                           



















8 te < 1 is required to avoid division by zero.
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3. Tax Normalization Effects
In the prototypical model in the literature, there are three tax instruments - two
commodity taxes (on the clean and dirty goods) and one tax on the sole input (labor).
When we normalize
9 such that the numeraire for both consumer and producer prices is the
1clean good, there is no tax on it. Emissions reduction is achieved by the dirty good tax,
and revenue-raising is done by the labor tax. This is an input tax system. The dirty good
tax in this case is less than the MED, because of the additional excess burden it generates
by distorting the consumption mix.  Thus the Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) result holds.
On the other hand, when we normalize such that the numeraire is labor, there is no tax on
it. The revenue-raising as well as emissions reduction has to be done by the two
commodity taxes. This is a commodity tax system. In this case, the dirty good tax can be
larger than the MED because the revenue requirement dictates an additional tax on the
dirty good, as pointed out by Fullerton (1997).
With emissions modeled as an input, the revenue is generated by commodity or input taxes
on consumers and emissions reduction is done by the emissions price (imposed as a
producer tax). Whether we normalize to get a commodity tax system or an input tax
system (also see footnote 8), the emissions tax on producers must be greater than or equal
to the MED. With commodity taxes, the marginal utility of income falls and factor prices
                                           
9 Because demand has the property of being homogeneous of degree zero in consumer prices,
only relative prices matter. Thus, one of the goods can be chosen as a  numeraire with its price
normalized to unity by dividing all prices by the price of this good. The same is true of producer
prices. With the presence of taxes, however, the consumer and producer prices are
differentiated. For convenience and ease of interpretation, we often use the same  numeraire for
both consumer and producer prices, causing the tax wedge between the two to disappear
through this “tax normalization”. Other normalizations are possible, however, and while a change
of normalization does not affect any quantities, relative consumer prices or relative producer
prices, relative consumer to producer prices and relative taxes can change.
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(including the emissions tax on producers) become higher than in the absence of
commodity taxes. With input taxes, the tax wedge forces the producer prices of inputs
(including the emissions tax on producers) higher than in the absence of input taxes. In
both cases, the emissions tax on producers can not fall below the MED at the first-best
(no-tax) optimum. This is shown below.
Multiplying through the consumer budget constraint by a constant, Q
10, increases all prices
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Plug it in (iv) to get:
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10 We can set    ) 1 ( 1 Q c t + =  to get an input tax system or    ) 1 ( 1 Q l t - =  to get a commodity tax
system.
11 In standard models of the literature, a commodity tax system entails setting  w=1 in addition to tl=0.





= l , but using the FOCs in (4), it
is simple to show that we still have  pe‡ MED.
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Thus, despite a change of normalization, the emissions price compares the same way with
the first-best MED as before, i.e., it is greater than or equal to the MED.
4. Interpretation
This section explains graphically how the emissions market is converted into an
equivalent emissions tax system and how this emissions tax becomes larger in
the presence of other taxes than it is in the absence of those taxes.
Consider the model with an emissions market where the consumer sells
emissions permits to the producers as described in section 2. There are no taxes
anywhere in the system. We plot the producers’ demand for permits as a
downward sloping (marginal benefit or value of marginal product of emissions)
curve and the consumer’s supply of permits as an upward sloping (marginal cost
of damage from emissions or marginal utility of permits reserved by the
consumer) curve.
This document is created using PDFmail (Copyright RTE Software)
http://www.pdfmail.com12
Now, we impose a consumer tax on the two commodities. This causes a
substitution away from their consumption and toward the consumption of
untaxed leisure and environment. Increased consumption of environmental
amenities by the consumer implies reduced supply of permits to the producers,
i.e., the supply curve shifts upward. Next, if we impose a consumer tax on the
inputs sold by the consumer, i.e., labor and emissions, the consumer price of
inputs goes down and he/she substitutes more leisure and environmental
amenities. Again the permits supply curve shifts upward, as shown in the figure
below.
In other words, regardless of whether the tax system is normalized as a
commodity tax system or as an input tax system, the supply curve shifts upward
and the emissions/permit price goes up.
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The tax causes a wedge between the producer price and the consumer price of
emissions permits, that differentiates the payment to the government and the
payment to the consumer as shown below:
Now, we take away the emissions permit market and replace it with a tax on
producers that equals the permit price in the market case. In terms of the above
figures, it means there is no supply curve but there is a marginal benefits curve
as the producers use emissions as input. The revenue from this producer tax is
divided exactly according to the above figure.
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This tax is exactly equal to the emissions price in the market case, and the
revenue from this tax is divided between the government and the consumer in
the same way as well. Since the emissions price goes up with the imposition of
commodity or input taxes, the producer emissions tax also does the same.
5. Conclusions
Modeling emissions a taxable production input, we show that the optimal emissions tax is
not less than the first-best Pigouvian tax. This is because of two reasons, either of which
can raise the emissions tax on producers in the second-best case above the first-best level.
In the second-best, to meet the revenue requirement, when commodity taxes are imposed,
the marginal utility of income falls. The consumer’s incentive to earn income falls, causing
him/her to consumer more leisure and also more pollution rights (environment). Since the
utility function is concave, the marginal disutility of labor (marginal utility of leisure)
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increases, and similarly, the marginal disutility of emissions (the marginal emissions
damage) also increases.
Also, to raise the revenue, when emissions tax on consumer is imposed, the wedge
between the consumer price of emissions and the producer price of emissions drives the
producer price up (since producers are the buyers of input). Thus when this price is
implemented as an emissions tax on producers, it is also larger (in the presence of the
emissions tax on consumers) .
Finally, our conclusion (that the emissions tax on producers is not less than the MED)
does not vary with the change of tax normalization, i.e., whether we have a commodity tax
system or input tax system. This is simply because the first reason above applies in a
commodity tax system and the second reason above applies in an input tax system, each of
which causes the emissions tax on producers to be higher than the MED (the first-best
tax).
___________________________________
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